Abstract:
Investigating the criteria for distinguishing analytical propositions and combinations from each other is one of the important contemporary epistemological topics. In this article, Quine's point of view about analytical and synthetic propositions has been examined. By criticizing concepts such as synonyms and semantic rules, Quine believes that there is no criterion for dividing propositions into analytical and synthetic propositions, and finally concludes that there is no proposition that Its truth is absolutely dependent on the language. At the end of the article, the opinions of other philosophers such as Richard Swinburne, Albert Kaslow and Roderick Chisham are expressed in the criticism of Quine's opinions.
Machine summary:
"In this article, Quine's point of view about analytical and synthetic propositions has been examined. By criticizing concepts such as synonyms and semantic rules, Quine believes that there is no criterion for dividing propositions into analytical and synthetic propositions, and finally concludes that there are no propositions. whose truth is absolutely dependent on the language. It seems that even if the criterion of contradiction is an acceptable criterion for distinguishing analytical and composite propositions from each other, the problem is still not over and one can ask why the negation of some propositions is required.But the negation of some others will not lead to contradiction? The two criteria of "insertion" and "contradiction" each have a specific approach in explaining what statement to consider as an analytical statement. Ayer himself called "two dogmatic rules of empiricism"[1] distinguishing between two types of analytical and synthetic propositions and believing in the truth of a part of propositions independent of empirical facts as one of the dogmatic rules of empiricism and believes that empiricism is to adhere to its principles , which is to refrain from presenting any dogmatic rulings about the world, you should give up these dogmatic rulingsAlthough Quine begins his critique of the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions from the second type of analytic propositions - that is, propositions that do not seem to have the structure of a logical truth but can be transformed into a logical truth - but in the end even logical truths It does not know reality independently