Abstract:
Phenomenalism[2] considers material objects as a logical combination[3] of sensory data[4]. Hence, speaking about material objects means speaking about sensory data. In other words, material object propositions [5] or object propositions [6] can be translated or referred [7] to sensory data propositions [8]. In this article, by defending the untranslatability of object propositions, we show that phenomenalism is inconsistent
.Machine summary:
"Ayer writes in the explanation of his definition: To say that material objects are a logical combination of sense data means that every object proposition is a set of sense data propositions [Ayer 1980: 125]. And the clearest defense ever made of the theory of the translatability of object propositions is the belief that every object proposition such as "this object is red" or "that is a doorknob" is referable to a set of propositions that are exclusively about sense data. He writes: Why should a phenomenologist define his theory in this way? Basically, phenomenology is not a theory that seeks to translate certain types of propositions into other types.Rather, it is a view about the nature of the material world. Pennyquick also uses the nation-citizen metaphor in refuting the theory of translatability: Let us compare the relationship that is claimed to exist between material objects and sense data with the relationship between nations and individuals, a comparison that has been made many times. Pennyquick and Armstrong use the metaphor of the nation-citizen in their second objection to Chizam: the relationship between material objects and sensory data is similar to the relationship between the nation and its citizens.That the nation is nothing more than a logical combination of citizens and their complex relationships does not require that propositions about the nation can be fully translated into propositions about citizens, in the same way, the assumption that material objects are nothing more than a logical combination of sensory data requires It is not that object propositions can be translated into sensory data propositions.