The philosophy of history is divided into theoretical philosophy of history and critical or analytical philosophy of history, according to the two different meanings of the word "history", that is, the series of past events - which is the subject of the historian's research - and the historian's research itself. The goal of the critical philosophy of history is to clarify the nature of historical research and reach its basic assumptions, systematizing concepts and research methods.Most of the philosophical writings about history are actually an attempt to answer the question whether it can be said without important restrictions and conditions that history is one of the empirical sciences or not? In response to this question and in the discussion of the type of explanation or understanding that historians are looking for, idealists often agree that the idea or concept of this type of explanation is different from the explanation that generally seems appropriate in scientific studies and in contrast to positivists. They usually deny this difference.
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He challenged the assumption that any explanation in response to the question "why?" is presented, and mentioning other types of explanation, such as explanation based on laws with limited scope, explanation based on the possibility of occurrence, observation on the reality of the event and collective explanation, which historians call as explanation, states that these types of explanations are Some conditions do not have positivist and idealistic explanations, but they are complete explanations in their own way, and some of the glory of the philosophers of history is that such explanations are not methodologically strong.It is actually ignoring the kind of question that has been asked, not objecting in the way that historians usually go about answering it. But it seems widely agreed that, insofar as they deal with specific events, they share one essential feature: they make it predictable by showing that what is to be explained falls under general empirical laws. Conversely, in history, they generally occur, especially at certain moments in narratives, where expectations arising from events that have occurred are overridden by what is discovered to happen later.This raises the question, "But how could that be?" There is also another reason why such explanations are much more likely to be offered in history than in the natural sciences: in addition to the presupposition of individual difference mentioned earlier, the fact that historians are prepared to make another philosophical assumption suggests that, apart from Whether it is true of the natural world or not, nothing in human affairs has antecedent determining conditions."